CVE-2026-118988

Status: Received

Description

CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC. Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.

Published
October 30, 2026 1:18 PM
Last Modified
October 30, 2026 1:18 PM
Source
9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e

Weaknesses (CWE)

CWE-22

References

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